Compliance

Compliance in Europe

Description of Compliance

The Concise Encyclopedia of the European Union describes compliance in the following terms: [1] As a result of the European Parliament’s requests, the Commission publishes an annual statistical table of individual states’ application of EU Directives. In its 1997 report the Commission noted that it was increasingly difficult to monitor compliance and commended the value of individual citizens’ ‘vigilance’ in reporting cases of failure to implement Community legislation. Non-compliancein fact comes in three forms – refusal to enact; refusal to comply; and refusal to enforce (see more in this European encyclopedia). On most counts France was reckoned to be the EU’s least obedient country at the end of the 20th century, followed by Italy and Germany. (See also Directive.)

Trust in Procedural Fairness and Pathways to Compliance: Findings From the Ess (belgian Data) and an Independent Student Sample

Lieven Pauwels, from the Ghent University, made a contribution to the 2012 Annual Conference of the European Society of Criminology, in the category “Crime and Society,” under the title “Trust in Procedural Fairness and Pathways to Compliance: Findings From the Ess (belgian Data) and an Independent Student Sample”. Here is the abstract: The present study examines “pathways” through which citizens comply with the law in Belgium. Instrumental (deterrence based) pathways to compliance are compared with a procedural justice driven and morality driven pathways. Firstly, it is examined to what extent trust in police effectiveness and trust in procedural fairness can explain individual differences in the moral obligation to obey the police and moral alignment, independent of personal morality and perceived risk of sanctions. Secondly, it is examined to what extent the aforementioned dimensions of police legitimacy are related to the tendency to comply with the law and self-reported offending. All analyses are conducted on the Belgian data from the European Social Survey (ESS Round 5) which explicitly included a rotating module that contained scale measures of trust and legitimacy. The model is additionally tested on an independent survey of university students using the ESS questions / items that were taken from the ESS trust module. The findings are rather robust: there is no empirical evidence for the existence of instrumental pathways to compliance in Belgium. Procedural fairness is indirectly related to compliance through its effect on the obligation to obey and moral alignment. Especially moral alignment has a strong effect on self-reported offenses (ESS question: buying stolen goods) but also on self-reported traffic offenses (in the student sample). Legal cynicism seems to mediate the relationship between legitimacy and self-reported traffic offenses. The implication of these findings are discussed.

Resources

See Also

Further Reading

  • “Trust in Procedural Fairness and Pathways to Compliance: Findings From the Ess (belgian Data) and an Independent Student Sample”, by Lieven Pauwels (Proceedings)

Resources

Notas y References

  1. Based on the book “A Concise Encyclopedia of the European Union from Aachen to Zollverein”, by Rodney Leach (Profile Books; London)

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