England, House of Lords.<\/p>\n
Lord Browne-Wilkinson:<\/p>\n
My Lords,<\/p>\n
As is well known, this case concerns an attempt by the Government of Spain to extradite Senator Pinochet from this country to stand trial in Spain for crimes committed (primarily in Chile) during the period when Senator Pinochet was head of state in Chile….<\/p>\n
* * *
\nThe Facts<\/p>\n
On September 11, 1973 a right-wing coup evicted the left-wing regime of President Allende. The coup was led by a military junta, of whom Senator (then General) Pinochet was the leader. At some stage he became head of state. The Pinochet regime remained in power until March 11, 1990 when Senator Pinochet resigned.<\/p>\n
There is no real dispute that during the period of the Senator Pinochet regime appalling acts of barbarism were committed in Chile and elsewhere in the world: torture, murder and the unexplained disappearance of individuals, all on a large scale. Although it is not alleged that Senator Pinochet himself committed any of those acts, it is alleged that they were done in pursuance of a conspiracy to which he was a party, at his instigation and with his knowledge. He denies these allegations. None of the conduct alleged was committed by or against citizens of the United Kingdom or in the United Kingdom.<\/p>\n
Map9-9a.gif (19901 bytes)
\nMap – England and Spian (1999)<\/p>\n
In 1998 Senator Pinochet came to the United Kingdom for medical treatment. The judicial authorities in Spain sought to extradite him in order to stand trial in Spain on a large number of charges. Some of those charges had links with Spain. But most of the charges had no connection with Spain. The background to the case is that to those of left-wing political convictions Senator Pinochet is seen as an arch-devil: to those of right-wing persuasions he is seen as the savior of Chile. It may well be thought that the trial of Senator Pinochet in Spain for offences all of which related to the state of Chile and most of which occurred in Chile is not calculated to achieve the best justice. But I cannot emphasize too strongly that that is no concern of your Lordships. Although others perceive our task as being to choose between the two sides on the grounds of personal preference or political inclination, that is an entire misconception. Our job is to decide two questions of law: are there any extradition crimes and, if so, is Senator Pinochet immune from trial for committing those crimes. If, as a matter of law, there are no extradition crimes or he is entitled to immunity in relation to whichever crimes there are, then there is no legal right to extradite Senator Pinochet to Spain or, indeed, to stand in the way of his return to Chile. If, on the other hand, there are extradition crimes in relation to which Senator Pinochet is not entitled to state immunity then it will be open to the Home Secretary to extradite him. The task of this House is only to decide those points of law.<\/p>\n
* * *<\/p>\n
[Section 134 of UK Criminal Justice Act of 1988 provides that official torture is one of the crimes for which a person may be extradited.]<\/p>\n
Torture<\/p>\n
* * *<\/p>\n
[After the Second World War] there was no tribunal or court to punish international crimes of torture. Local courts could take jurisdiction: see … Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann.[2] But the objective was to ensure a general jurisdiction so that the torturer was not safe wherever he went. For example, in this case it is alleged that during the Pinochet regime torture was an official, although unacknowledged, weapon of government and that, when the regime was about to end, it passed legislation designed to afford an amnesty to those who had engaged in institutionalised torture. If these allegations are true, the fact that the local court had jurisdiction to deal with the international crime of torture was nothing to the point so long as the totalitarian regime remained in power: a totalitarian regime will not permit adjudication by its own courts on its own shortcomings. Hence the demand for some international machinery to repress state torture which is not dependent upon the local courts where the torture was committed. In the event, over 110 states (including Chile, Spain and the United Kingdom) became state parties to the Torture Convention. But it is far from clear that none of them practised state torture. What was needed therefore was an international system which could punish those who were guilty of torture and which did not permit the evasion of punishment by the torturer moving from one state to another. The Torture Convention was agreed … to provide an international system under which the international criminal–the torturer–could find no safe haven. …<\/p>\n
The Torture Convention<\/p>\n
Article 1 of the Convention defines torture as the intentional infliction of severe pain and of suffering with a view to achieving a wide range of purposes “when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiesence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Article 2(1) requires each state party to prohibit torture on territory within its own jurisdiction and Article 4 requires each state party to ensure that “all” acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. Article 2(3) outlaws any defence of superior orders. Under Article 5(1) each state party has to establish its jurisdiction over torture (a) when committed within territory under its jurisdiction (b) when the alleged offender is a national of that state, and (c) in certain circumstances, when the victim is a national of that state. Under Article 5(2) a state party has to take jurisdiction over any alleged offender who is found within its territory. Article 6 contains provisions for a state in whose territory an alleged torturer is found to detain him, inquire into the position and notify the states referred to in Article 5(1) and to indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction. Under Article 7 the state in whose territory the alleged torturer is found shall, if he is not extradited to any of the states mentioned in Article 5(1), submit him to its authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Under Article 8(1) torture is to be treated as an extraditable offence and under Article 8(4) torture shall, for the purposes of extradition, be treated as having been committed not only in the place where it occurred but also in the state mentioned in Article 5(1).<\/p>\n
* * *<\/p>\n
Lord Millett :<\/p>\n
My Lords,<\/p>\n
* * *<\/p>\n
State immunity is not a personal right. It is an attribute of the sovereignty of the state. The immunity which is in question in the present case, therefore, belongs to the Republic of Chile, not to Senator Pinochet. It may be asserted or waived by the state, but where it is waived by treaty or convention the waiver must be express. So much is not in dispute.
\n\tMap9-9aa.gif (7207 bytes)
\nMap – Chile (1999)<\/p>\n
The doctrine of state immunity is the product of the classical theory of international law. This taught that states were the only actors on the international plane; the rights of individuals were not the subject of international law. States were sovereign and equal: it followed that one state could not be impleaded in the national courts of another; par in parem non habet imperium.[.[2]] States were obliged to abstain from interfering in the internal affairs of one another. International law was not concerned with the way in which a sovereign state treated its own nationals in its own territory. It is a cliche of modern international law that the classical theory no longer prevails in its unadulterated form. The idea that individuals who commit crimes recognized as such by international law may be held internationally accountable for their actions is now an accepted doctrine of international law. The adoption by most major jurisdictions of the restrictive theory of state immunity, enacted into English law by Part I of the State Immunity Act 1978, has made major inroads into the doctrine as a bar to the jurisdiction of national courts to entertain civil proceedings against foreign states. The question before your Lordships is whether a parallel, though in some respects opposite, development has taken place so as to restrict the availability of state immunity as a bar to the criminal jurisdiction of national courts.<\/p>\n
Two overlapping immunities are recognized by international law; immunity ratione personae[[3]] and immunity ratione materiae. [[4]] They are quite different and have different rationales.<\/p>\n
Immunity ratione personae is a status immunity. An individual who enjoys its protection does so because of his official status. It inures for his benefit only so long as he holds office. While he does so he enjoys absolute immunity from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the national courts of foreign states. But it is only narrowly available. It is confined to serving heads of state and heads of diplomatic missions, their families and servants. It is not available to serving heads of government who are not also heads of state, military commanders and those in charge of the security forces, or their subordinates. It would have been available to Hitler but not to Mussolini or Tojo. It is reflected in English law by section 20(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978, enacting customary international law and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961).<\/p>\n
The immunity of a serving head of state is enjoyed by reason of his special status as the holder of his state\u2019s highest office. He is regarded as the personal embodiment of the state itself. It would be an affront to the dignity and sovereignty of the state which he personifies and a denial of the equality of sovereign states to subject him to the jurisdiction of the municipal courts of another state, whether in respect of his public acts or private affairs. His person is inviolable; he is not liable to be arrested or detained on any ground whatever. The head of a diplomatic mission represents his head of state and thus embodies the sending state in the territory of the receiving state. While he remains in office he is entitled to the same absolute immunity as his head of state in relation both to his public and private acts.<\/p>\n
This immunity is not in issue in the present case. Senator Pinochet is not a serving head of state. If he were, he could not be extradited. It would be an intolerable affront to the Republic of Chile to arrest him or detain him.<\/p>\n
Immunity ratione materiae is very different. This is a subject-matter immunity. It operates to prevent the official and governmental acts of one state from being called into question in proceedings before the courts of another, and only incidentally confers immunity on the individual. It is therefore a narrower immunity but it is more widely available. It is available to former heads of state and heads of diplomatic missions, and any one whose conduct in the exercise of the authority of the state is afterwards called into question, whether he acted as head of government, government minister, military commander or chief of police, or subordinate public official. The immunity is the same whatever the rank of the office-holder. This too is common ground. It is an immunity from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of foreign national courts but only in respect of governmental or official acts. The exercise of authority by the military and security forces of the state is the paradigm example of such conduct. The immunity finds its rationale in the equality of sovereign states and the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. These hold that the courts of one state cannot sit in judgment on the sovereign acts of another. The immunity is sometimes also justified by the need to prevent the serving head of state or diplomat from being inhibited in the performance of his official duties by fear of the consequences after he has ceased to hold office. This last basis can hardly be prayed in aid to support the availability of the immunity in respect of criminal activities prohibited by international law.<\/p>\n
Given its scope and rationale, it is closely similar to and may be indistinguishable from aspects of the Anglo-American Act of State doctrine. As I understand the difference between them, state immunity is a creature of international law and operates as a plea in bar to the jurisdiction of the national court, whereas the Act of State doctrine is a rule of domestic law which holds the national court incompetent to adjudicate upon the lawfulness of the sovereign acts of a foreign state.<\/p>\n
Immunity ratione materiae is given statutory form in English law by the combined effect of section 20(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978, the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964, and Article 39.2 of the Vienna Convention. …<\/p>\n
The charges brought against Senator Pinochet are concerned with his public and official acts, first as Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean army and later as head of state. He is accused of having embarked on a widespread and systematic reign of terror in order to obtain power and then to maintain it. If the allegations against him are true, he deliberately employed torture as an instrument of state policy. As international law stood on the eve of the Second World War, his conduct as head of state after he seized power would probably have attracted immunity ratione materiae. If so, I am of opinion that it would have been equally true of his conduct during the period before the coup was successful. He was not then, of course, head of state. But he took advantage of his position as Commander-in-Chief of the army and made use of the existing military chain of command to deploy the armed forces of the state against its constitutional government. These were not private acts. They were official and governmental or sovereign acts by any standard.<\/p>\n
The immunity is available whether the acts in question are illegal or unconstitutional or otherwise unauthorized under the internal law of the state, since the whole purpose of state immunity is to prevent the legality of such acts from being adjudicated upon in the municipal courts of a foreign state. A sovereign state has the exclusive right to determine what is and is not illegal or unconstitutional under its own domestic law. Even before the end of the Second World War, however, it was questionable whether the doctrine of state immunity accorded protection in respect of conduct which was prohibited by international law. As early as 1841, according to Quincy Wright,[5] many commentators held the view that:<\/p>\n
the Government’s authority could not confer immunity upon its agents for acts beyond its powers under international law.<\/p>\n
* * *<\/p>\n
The landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Israel in Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann[6] is also of great significance. Eichmann had been a very senior official of the Third Reich. He was in charge of Department IV D-4 of the Reich Main Security Office, the Department charged with the implementation of the Final Solution, and subordinate only to Heydrich and Himmler. He was abducted from Argentina and brought to Israel, where he was tried in the District Court for Tel Aviv. His appeal against conviction was dismissed by the Supreme Court. …<\/p>\n
* * *<\/p>\n
… [The Israeli Supreme Court] rejected the defense of Act of State. As formulated [by the court], this did not differ in any material respect from a plea of immunity ratione materiae. It was based on the fact that in committing the offences of which he had been convicted the accused had acted as an organ of the state, \u201cwhether as head of the state or a responsible official acting on the government\u2019s orders.\u201d The court applied Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter (which it will be remembered expressly referred to the head of state) and which it regarded as having become part of the law of nations.<\/p>\n
The case is authority for three propositions:<\/p>\n
(1) There is no rule of international law which prohibits a state from exercising extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in respect of crimes committed by foreign nationals abroad.<\/p>\n
(2) War crimes and atrocities of the scale and international character of the Holocaust are crimes of universal jurisdiction under customary international law.<\/p>\n
(3) The fact that the accused committed the crimes in question in the course of his official duties as a responsible officer of the state and in the exercise of his authority as an organ of the state is no bar to the exercise of the jurisdiction of a national court.<\/p>\n
* * *<\/p>\n
I turn … to the plea of immunity ratione materiae in relation to the … allegations of torture, conspiracy to torture and conspiracy to murder. I can deal with the charges of conspiracy to murder quite shortly. The offences are alleged to have taken place in the requesting state. The plea of immunity ratione materiae is not available in respect of an offence committed in the forum state, whether this be England or Spain.<\/p>\n
The definition of torture, both in the [United Nations Convention Against Torture and and section 134 of UK Criminal Justice Act of 1988], is in my opinion entirely inconsistent with the existence of a plea of immunity ratione materiae. The offence can be committed only by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. The official or governmental nature of the act, which forms the basis of the immunity, is an essential ingredient of the offence. No rational system of criminal justice can allow an immunity which is co-extensive with the offence.<\/p>\n
In my view a serving head of state or diplomat could still claim immunity ratione personae if charged with an offence under section 134. He does not have to rely on the character of the conduct of which he is accused. The nature of the charge is irrelevant; his immunity is personal and absolute. But the former head of state and the former diplomat are in no different position from anyone else claiming to have acted in the exercise of state authority. If the respondent’s arguments were accepted, section 134 would be a dead letter. Either the accused was acting in a private capacity, in which case he cannot be charged with an offence under the section; or he was acting in an official capacity, in which case he would enjoy immunity from prosecution. Perceiving this weakness in her argument, counsel for Senator Pinochet submitted that the United Kingdom took jurisdiction so that it would be available if, but only if, the offending state waived its immunity. I reject this explanation out of hand. It is not merely far-fetched; it is entirely inconsistent with the aims and object of the Convention. The evidence shows that other states were to be placed under an obligation to take action precisely because the offending state could not be relied upon to do so.<\/p>\n
My Lords, the Republic of Chile was a party to the Torture Convention, and must be taken to have assented to the imposition of an obligation on foreign national courts to take and exercise criminal jurisdiction in respect of the official use of torture. I do not regard it as having thereby waived its immunity. In my opinion there was no immunity to be waived. The offence is one which could only be committed in circumstances which would normally give rise to the immunity. The international community had created an offence for which immunity ratione materiae could not possibly be available. International law cannot be supposed to have established a crime having the character of a jus cogens and at the same time to have provided an immunity which is co-extensive with the obligation it seeks to impose.<\/p>\n
In my opinion, acts which attract state immunity in civil proceedings because they are characterised as acts of sovereign power may, for the very same reason, attract individual criminal liability. The respondents relied on a number of cases which show that acts committed in the exercise of sovereign power do not engage the civil liability of the state even if they are contrary to international law. I do not find those decisions determinative of the present issue or even relevant. In England and the United States they depend on the terms of domestic legislation; though I do not doubt that they correctly represent the position in international law. I see nothing illogical or contrary to public policy in denying the victims of state sponsored torture the right to sue the offending state in a foreign court while at the same time permitting (and indeed requiring) other states to convict and punish the individuals responsible if the offending state declines to take action. This was the very object of the Torture Convention. It is important to emphasise that Senator Pinochet is not alleged to be criminally liable because he was head of state when other responsible officials employed torture to maintain him in power. He is not alleged to be vicariously liable for the wrongdoing of his subordinates. He is alleged to have incurred direct criminal responsibility for his own acts in ordering and directing a campaign of terror involving the use of torture. Chile insists on the exclusive right to prosecute him. The Torture Convention, however, gives it only the primary right. If it does not seek his extradition (and it does not) then the United Kingdom is obliged to extradite him to another requesting state or prosecute him itself.<\/p>\n
* * *<\/p>\n
The House of Lords granted the appeal to the \u201cextent necessary to permit the extradition proceedings to continue in respect of the crimes of torture (and where it is alleged that torture resulted) of conspiracy to torture, allegedly committed by Senator Pinochet after December 8, 1988.\u201d<\/p>\n
[[1] International Law Reports, vol. 36, p. 5 (1962).<\/p>\n
[[2] Latin: \u201cone equal to another does not have jurisdiction.\u201d]<\/p>\n
[[3] Latin: \u201cbased upon personality.\u201d]<\/p>\n
[[4] Latin: \u201cbased upon subject matter.\u201d]<\/p>\n
[5] See American Journal of International Law, vol. 41, at p. 71 (1947).<\/p>\n
[6] International Law Reports, vol. 36, p. 5 (1962).<\/p>\n
See Also<\/strong><\/p>\n Act of State Doctrine Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others (Ex Parte Pinochet) in Europe England, House of Lords. Lord Browne-Wilkinson: My Lords, As is well known, this case concerns an attempt by the Government of Spain to extradite Senator Pinochet from this country […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[254,190,69,52],"tags":[278,82,139,279,186],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawlegal.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6391"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawlegal.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawlegal.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawlegal.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawlegal.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6391"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/lawlegal.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6391\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawlegal.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6391"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawlegal.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6391"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawlegal.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6391"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\nImmunities of States
\nBanco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"